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Constitutional Law. State v. Beauregard, 198 A.3d 1 (R.I. 2018).
The admission at trial of physical evidence stemming from an
inadmissible statement made without proper notice of a defendant’s
rights, as stated in Miranda v. Arizona,1 does not violate article 1,
section 13, of the Rhode Island Constitution, which mirrors
protections granted by the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, so long as the defendant made the statement
voluntarily.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Sendra Beauregard (Defendant) was indicted by a grand jury
on counts of first-degree murder and discharging a firearm while
committing a crime of violence. 2 On December 2, 2014, Defendant
and the victim, Pamela Donohue (Donohue), Defendant’s girlfriend,
were at Donohue’s apartment. 3 Walter Woodyatt (Woodyatt),
Dononhue’s roommate and former boyfriend, testified that
Defendant gave him $40 and asked him to buy cigarettes and soda. 4
While returning from the store Woodyatt saw Defendant driving
away in her vehicle. 5 Upon his entry into the apartment Woodyatt
found Donohue unresponsive and called the police.6 The
paramedics later arrived and took Donohue’s body to the hospital
where she was pronounced dead from a single gunshot wound to the
chest.7
The next day, detectives met Defendant at her apartment in
Johnston, Rhode Island, and she agreed to accompany them to the
police station to discuss Donohue’s death.8 While Defendant was
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
State v. Beauregard, 198 A.3d 1, 3 (R.I. 2018).
Id. at 4.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at the police station officers obtained and executed a search
warrant at her apartment, but “found nothing of evidentiary
value.” 9 However, detectives located her vehicle parked behind the
apartment building and towed it to the police station until they
could obtain a warrant to search it. Once police had acquired a
warrant, they searched the vehicle and discovered a spent shell
casing. 10
During the Defendant’s first interview with the police she was
given proper notice of her Miranda rights.11 Defendant admitted
that she and Donohue had gotten into an argument after sending
Woodyatt for cigarettes, but maintained that Donohue was alive
when she left.12 When Defendant asked for counsel the police
terminated the interview and she left the station. 13
Several weeks later, police executed a warrant for Defendant’s
arrest, and she was booked and processed. 14 When Defendant was
interviewed for the second time she promptly asked about her
attorney before being read her rights. 15 Defendant referred to
counsel several more times, but the detectives nevertheless
continued the interview.16 The detectives related the discovery of
the shell casing, but Defendant denied any knowledge of its
origin. 17 At this point, Defendant became agitated and the
detectives became briefly argumentative in response. 18 During the
latter half of the interview the detectives misrepresented that the
shell casing had been matched to the bullet recovered from
Donohue’s corpse, but the Defendant maintained her innocence.19
The interview ended when Defendant once again requested
representation.20
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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Several hours later, with no subsequent interactions with the
police, Defendant requested to speak with the detectives. 21 During
this third interview a detective told Defendant that the “same rules
apply,” which she acknowledged, but there was no formal statement
of her Miranda rights. 22 Defendant then confessed to shooting
Donohue in the chest, and that she had hidden the murder
weapon. 23 She agreed to lead the police to the gun the next
morning.24
After arriving at the dump site the next morning, Defendant
pointed to the general direction where she had hidden the gun, but
did not accompany the detectives while they searched. 25 The
detectives were subsequently able to locate the gun.26 At no point
during this “fourth interview” did the police read Defendant her
Miranda rights.27
Before trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress concerning
the search and seizure of her vehicle, which was denied,28 and
subsequently, motions to suppress the admission of the statements
and physical evidence garnered from those statements that were
obtained in violation of her Miranda rights. 29 During the motion
hearing, the State conceded that Defendant’s Miranda rights had
been violated with respect to the second, third, and fourth
interviews, and any statements made during those interviews were
therefore inadmissible, leaving only the physical evidence attained
through those statements to be considered.30 Defendant petitioned
the court to depart from the United States Supreme Court’s holding
in United States v. Patane, which rendered admissible physical
evidence attained as a result of inadmissible statements so long as
the underlying statement was voluntary, and instead follow some
state decisions where courts found broader protections under state

21. Id.
22. Id. at 7.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 8.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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constitutional provisions.31 The trial court concluded that previous
Rhode Island Supreme Court decisions “constrained” adherence to
Patane, and determined that Defendant’s statements were made
voluntarily.32 As a result, the court also denied the latter motion
to suppress. 33
At trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and
discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence.34 She
was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences, and subsequently
appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court (the Court).35
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal of a motion to suppress a confession, the Court first
defers to the trial justice’s finding of the voluntariness of the
confession unless clearly erroneous, and second, because of the
constitutional dimensions of the issue, conducts a de novo review of
the voluntariness of the confession.36
First, the Court considered whether it would follow Patane.37
In Patane, the United States Supreme Court found that Miranda
rights related exclusively to the Self-Incrimination Clause of the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 38 Therefore,
protections were necessary only to prevent “compelling a criminal
defendant to testify against himself at trial,” and did not apply to
“nontestimonial evidence obtained as a result of voluntary
statements.” 39 The Court noted several states that had rejected
Patane and recognized broader protections against selfincrimination in their own constitutions than those afforded under
the United States Constitution. 40 However, protections under
article I, section 13, of the Rhode Island Constitution 41 had been
31. Id. (citing United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636–37 (2004)).
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. Id at 9.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 10 (citing United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636 (2004)).
39. Id. (quoting Patane, 542 U.S. at 637).
40. Id. at 10.
41. “No person in a court of common law shall be compelled to give selfcriminating evidence.” R.I. Const. art. I, § 13.
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“interpreted as tantamount to those available under the Federal
Constitution” for issues arising from Miranda rights. 42 Due to their
strong adherence to interpretations of the federal constitution in
past decisions, the Court adopted Patane.43
Next, the Court examined whether Defendant’s statements
leading to the collection of the murder weapon were voluntary
under the totality of the circumstances by clear and convincing
evidence. 44 While Defendant submitted her mental illness as
evidence that she was coerced into making her confession, the Court
stated that the mental state of the Defendant was immaterial
unless “emanating from . . . official coercion,” because analysis of a
potentially coerced confession centers on police conduct, not
independent psychological pressures. 45 The Court examined the
various recordings of the Defendant’s interviews and determined
that her statements were voluntary because the tone of the
interviews was conversational, the detectives gave her various
items to ensure her comfort, Defendant voluntarily initiated the
interview in which she confessed, and police did not act coercively
by waiting nineteen days to arrest her or by misrepresenting the
connection between the shell casing seized from her car and
Donohue’s body. 46 The Court agreed with the trial justice that
Defendant’s statements were voluntary, and therefore there was no
error in allowing the physical evidence emanating from the
statements to be admitted at trial. 47
Finally, the Court examined the search and seizure of
Defendant’s vehicle, determining that the trial justice was correct
in finding the police had probable cause for the search based on the
reliability of Woodyatt’s statements that Defendant left the scene
in her vehicle after Donohue was shot. 48 Furthermore, the Court
noted that police had not executed a warrantless search, as would

42. Beauregard, 198 A.3d at 12 (quoting R.I. Grand Jury v. Doe, 641 A.2d
1295, 1296 (R.I. 1994)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 13.
45. Id. (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986)).
46. Id. at 14–15.
47. Id. at 15.
48. Id. at 16.
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have been permissible under the “automobile exception,” but
instead obtained a search warrant for the Defendant’s vehicle.49
COMMENTARY
Although the Court examined approaches taken in other states
regarding the adoption of Patane, it did not itself examine the
possible repercussions of the doctrine. 50 The Court admonished the
police for their repeated failure to provide counsel upon Defendant’s
request, but noted that it was not the Court’s place to set standards
for police practices. 51 However, to leave such conduct unaddressed
is to give license to further abuses. 52 Indeed, the very bedrock of
Miranda is an acknowledgment that it is sometimes necessary to
intervene in police practice in order to protect the constitutional
rights of the accused.53 The protections in Miranda rested on the
inherently coercive nature of police interrogations and the difficulty
for courts in determining whether a confession was truly
voluntary. 54 Patane gives police an incentive to abuse their duty to
respect a suspect’s Miranda rights by allowing courts to undertake
a subjective analysis of the coercive nature of any given
interrogation, opening the door for potentially poisonous fruits to
reach its lips. 55 At the very least, Patane weakens the uniform
necessity for the police to properly state a suspect’s Miranda rights
when endeavoring to run a successful investigation.56 As clear as
the Court’s jurisprudence may be in following the United States
Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Fifth Amendment, an issue

49. Id. at 17. The “automobile exception” to the necessity of police
obtaining a warrant prior to a search is applicable where the police have
“probable cause to believe that an automobile . . . holds contraband or evidence
of a crime.” See State v. Werner, 615 A.2d 1010, 1013–14 (R.I. 1992).
50. See Beauregard, 198 A.3d at 10–11.
51. Id. at 12.
52. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 645–46 (2004) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
53. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457–58 (1966) (“The current
practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our nation’s
most cherished principles—that the individual may not be compelled to
incriminate himself.”).
54. Patane, 542 U.S. at 645 (Souter, J., dissenting).
55. See id. at 647.
56. See id.
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of such constitutional dimensions surely deserved a more thorough
analysis by the Court.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine did not extend to physical evidence
stemming from unwarned and inadmissible, yet voluntary,
statements because of complimentary jurisprudence on
interpretation of Rhode Island’s own constitutional selfincrimination clause with regards to the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, rendering such physical evidence
admissible at trial.
Jonathan Stark-Sachs

